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Illiquidity and all its friends1
Jean Tirole 2

Abstract
The recent crisis was characterized by massive illiquidity. This paper reviews what we know
and don't know about illiquidity and all its friends: market freezes, fire sales, contagion, and
ultimately insolvencies and bailouts. It first explains why liquidity cannot easily be
apprehended through a single statistics, and asks whether liquidity should be regulated given
that a capital adequacy requirement is already in place. The paper then analyzes market
breakdowns due to either adverse selection or shortages of financial muscle, and explains
why such breakdowns are endogenous to balance sheet choices and to information
acquisition. It then looks at what economics can contribute to the debate on systemic risk
and its containment.
Finally, the paper takes a macroeconomic perspective, discusses shortages of aggregate
liquidity and analyses how market value accounting and capital adequacy should react to
asset prices. It concludes with a topical form of liquidity provision, monetary bailouts and
recapitalizations, and analyses optimal combinations thereof; it stresses the need for macroprudential policies.
JEL classification: E44; E52; G28.
Keywords: Liquidity; contagion; bailouts; regulation.
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1.

Introduction

The recent crisis, we all know, was characterized by massive illiquidity. Various markets
(money, corporate debt, securitization, CDOs, etc.) ground to a halt. Investors ran on a
variety of institutions, including Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and Northern Rock before
authorities guaranteed a substantial fraction of the financial system. Financial institutions and
industrial companies scrambled for cash by selling assets at fire sale prices. Central banks
injected unprecedented amounts of liquidity into the system.
Concurrently, much of the current thinking on regulatory reform focuses on how to avoid a
repeat of this episode. Regulators strive to homogenize their measurement of liquidity and to
improve their stress tests. The Financial Stability Forum 3 (2009) calls for "a joint research
program to measure funding and liquidity risk attached to maturity transformation, enabling
the pricing of liquidity risk in the financial system" (Recommendation 3.2) and recommends
that "the BIS and IMF could make available to authorities information on leverage and
maturity mismatches on a system-wide basis" (Recommendation 3.3). Fair value accounting,
once a darling of the financial community, has been at least temporarily relaxed, on the
grounds that it creates excess supply of liquidity in booms, and (more relevant to the
decision) shortages thereof when asset prices fall.
But what is liquidity? Relatedly, why do firms and financial institutions fear illiquidity? Why
can't they return to the capital market whenever they need to finance worthwhile (understand:
"positive net present value") undertakings, be they new projects or the continuation of
existing ones? What determines the overall amount of liquidity in the economy? What
implications do economic analyses of liquidity have for financial regulation?
This paper reviews what we know and don't know about illiquidity and all its friends: market
freezes, fire sales, contagion, and ultimately insolvencies and bailouts. Building on the
familiar notions of funding and market liquidity, Section 2 explains why liquidity cannot easily
be apprehended through a single statistics. Section 3 reviews the determinants of corporate
liquidity management and, given that prudential regulation traditionnally has focused on the
measurement of solvency, asks whether liquidity should be regulated when a capital
adequacy requirement is already in place. After these preambles, Sections 4 through 7 form
the core of the paper. Section 4 first analyzes market breakdowns due to adverse selection
and why such breakdowns are endogenous to balance sheet choices and to information
acquisition, and then points at the role of financial muscle and limits to arbitrage. Section 5
looks at what economics can contribute to the debate on systemic risk and its containment.
Section 6 takes a macroeconomic view and discusses shortages of aggregate liquidity; it
then analyses how market value accounting and capital adequacy should react to asset
prices. And it enunciates some principles for an optimal policy of public supply of liquidity.
Section 7 focuses on a topical form of liquidity provision, monetary bailouts and
recapitalizations, and analyses optimal combinations thereof; it concludes with a rationale for
macro-prudential policies.

2.
Liquidity comes in many guises... or the elusive concept of
liquidity
For the sake of illustration consider a bank and its starkly simplified balance sheet depicted
in Figure 1, and suppose that this bank needs new cash in order to finance an expansion or

3
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an acquisition, or to withstand an unexpected loss in earnings or asset value. Alternatively,
its wholesale depositors may have run away.

To meet its liquidity shortfall, the bank may count on either funding or market liquidity. 4
Funding liquidity. Funding liquidity traditionally refers to the liability side of the balance sheet.
The bank may issue new wholesale deposits, long-term bonds, preferred stocks, straight
equity or still other securities. By so doing it dilutes its existing investors.
How much can be raised on the liability side depends on the economic environment; for
example, improved corporate governance assuages investors' concern about the prospect of
not recouping the money they invested; in economics jargon, better corporate governance
increases the pledgeability of firm resources to investors. Thus, better corporate governance
institutions facilitate refinancing by the corporate sector and thereby boost funding liquidity.
Another determinant of funding liquidity is the ease with which existing claims can be
renegotiated. Funding liquidity involves diluting existing claimholders and therefore may
require their consent. A large literature has discussed debt overhang, the idea that some
claimholders, usually debtholders, attempt to free ride in a restructuring of the liability side.
When the institution needs new cash to refinance itself, each claimholder would like others to
make concessions (accept to be diluted, to bring in new cash) while keeping the full value of
his claim for himself. The free riding issue has for example been prominently discussed in the
context of sovereign debt restructuring. A unanimity rule clearly fosters free-riding while a
qualified majority rule enhances funding liquidity. 5
Finally, funding liquidity may be pre-arranged, for reasons that we will shortly elucidate. The
institution can secure a credit line or more generally some form of liquidity support from
another institution.
Market liquidity. To generate cash over and beyond the yield accruing from assets on its
balance sheet, the bank can also sell easily-tradable assets such as T-bills, or alternatively
use these as collateral in borrowing operations such as repos. Another strategy for banks to
raise cash on the asset side is to securitize a portfolio of loans that it has issued. We will
return to securitization later on. Assets like T-bills are usually said to be liquid in that they are
traded in deep markets under limited asymmetries of information, and therefore sold with low

4

The role of these two forms of liquidity has been emphasized in particular by Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009).
The dichotomy between funding liquidity (liability side of the balance sheet) and market liquidity (asset side of
the balance sheet) is primarily for convenience and is not as sharp as one would wish. Indeed, some cash
infusions, such as the securitization of a loan portfolio with a contingent promise of liquidity support to the
corresponding conduit, involve both sides of the balance sheet.

5

At least in the short run. In the long run the ease with which debt claims can be renegotiated may deter
investors from acquiring them. This is an instance of the trade-off between leverage and liquidity that we will
later emphasize.
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haircuts or discounts. But so do stock market indices such as the S&P500. The
distinguishing feature of T-bills, as we will later discuss, is that unlike stock indices, one can
pretty much count on their delivering cash when cash is needed.
That the liquidity of assets is driven not only by market micro-structure, but also by
macroeconomic considerations is actually an old theme in economics. Borrowing from
Marshall and Pigou, Keynes (1936) and Hicks (1967) emphasized liquidity preference for
transaction and precautionary purposes (associated with foreseen and ill-foreseen needs,
respectively), and made a distinction between running and reserve assets on the one hand,
and speculative or investment assets on the other hand, where the latter are held for their
yield.
Funding and market liquidity tend to be correlated, as we have seen in the recent crisis.
When potential buyers have difficulties raising funds and may even be in the process of
downsizing, it becomes hard for sellers to depart from their assets. Conversely, market
illiquidity may make investors reluctant to bring funds to a bank that, they know, will have
trouble selling assets.
But liquidity depends on other factors as well:


Risk management and financial structure. The flip side of liquidity management is
risk management, namely the extent to which the bank's returns are insulated
against shocks that are not under the control of the bank. This takes the form of
interest rate, exchange rate, and credit default swaps, or other derivative contracts;
such contracts can be viewed as pre-arranged, contingent liquidity support
arrangements. Thus, one cannot assess a bank's liquidity position without also
considering its hedging policy. 6
Relatedly, the bank can also make the occurrence of liquidity shortfalls less likely by
issuing equity, long-term debt and preferred stocks (a form of debt which allows the
institution to delay the payment of coupons as long as dividends on ordinary shares
are not paid), or by including covenants allowing debt-equity swaps in certain
circumstances; it thereby reduces calls for cash, especially in hard times.



Reputation risk. Some institutions may be tempted (as Bear Stearns was a couple of
months before its collapse) to rescue vehicles toward which they have no legal
obligations. The private rationale for this is to attempt to restore a tarnished
reputation by signaling strength, therby “speculating on one’s franchise value”. 7 This
risk unfortunately has not been properly accounted for, as the corresponding
"obligations" do not carry any capital charge under current regulations.
One possible reform in this respect would consist in trying to measure such implicit
liabilities and in imposing a capital charge on them. Finding the right capital charges
is likely to be complex. Given that the rationale for honoring such implicit obligations
is signaling, and that signaling is often wasteful, I would rather suggest that
regulators do not allow banks to honor (at least without penalty) obligations they
have no legal obligation to honor. This prohibition would eliminate the supplemental
reputation risk (the reputational damage done by a failing conduit is there anyway)
associated with not honoring implicit commitments. And especially it would prevent

6

This observation of course does not imply that full hedging is desirable; indeed it may not be advisable to fully
cover one's risks for a number of reasons: transaction costs, serially-correlated profits, CAPM-style
arguments, asymmetric information, incentives, market power, and strategic considerations. For a review of
these reasons, see Tirole (2006, p. 216-220); and see Léautier-Rochet (2009) for an analysis of hedging in
oligopoly markets.

7
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banks from taking on contingent liabilities without allocating capital to them; put
differently, the prohibition would eliminate a channel of regulatory evasion. 8
These considerations explain why capturing the notion of an "illiquid balance sheet" in a
single statistics is a difficult exercise. It is no wonder that prudential measurements of
liquidity ratios are many, even though their approach usually consists in measuring some
mismatch between short-term liabilities (making some assumptions on the fraction of those
that could be called and therefore not rolled over) and liquid assets (again, building on
hypotheses on market liquidity). Recently, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has added
another liquidity requirement based on the “core funding ratio”, that forces banks to fund at
least 75% of total lending through sticky liabilities such as retail deposits and wholesale
borrowing maturing in more than a year. 9
A complementary approach reflects the idea that "you know it when you stress it"; that is, one
can formulate some hypotheses as to the co-evolution of key variables and the operation of
markets and look at the implications of various scenarii on the available cash for the bank.
Such stress tests are only as good as the statistical environment they are fed with (recall the
wrongful use of short and favorable time series in the assessments of risk prior to the crisis).
But they nonetheless convey information about the liquidity of the balance sheet.

3.

Demand for liquidity

3.1

Basics

a)

The need for financial planning.

The raison d’être of corporate financial management is that revenues and outlays are not
perfectly synchronized. The lack of synchronicity between cash flows and cash needs implies
that firms and financial institutions must find ways of covering their needs in periods of
shortfall. Two broad strategies are available to this purpose: "finance as you go" and "liquidity
hoarding".
"Finance as you go" consists in returning to the capital market and borrowing from investors
and other corporations when needs arise. Note that markets would satisfactorily bridge the
temporal gaps between revenues and expenditures in a world of perfect (understand
"agency-cost free") capital markets.
"Finance as you go" however has its limits. Financial market imperfections, which
encompass moral hazard, adverse selection (asymmetries of information about assets in
place and projects), and mere transaction costs, make it hard for cash-strapped corporations
to raise financing even for positive net-present-value actions. The subprime crisis is a case in
point: the lending to the ECB rather than to cash-strapped banks by banks with excess
liquidity, the stalling of the securitization and collateralised debt obligation (CDO) markets,
the corporate credit spread, and the overall credit crunch despite the injection of liquidity by
central banks all illustrate the difficulty of relying on markets for refinancing.
For this reason, corporations must complement the recourse to the financial market by some
planning of their own. That is, they must hoard liquidity either directly (by holding securities
on their own books, ot by taking on limited short-term debt so as not to be forced to pay back

8

On this topic see the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision consultative document (2009), which offers to
address reputation risk through pillar 2 of the Basel II accords.

9

The Economist, September 5, 2009.
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their entire short-term income to investors) or indirectly (by securing credit lines from banks,
insurance companies, or parent companies, which hold securities on their own balance
sheets to back these lines of credit).
b)

Transformation and maturity mismatches.

Liquidity management and the concepts of funding and market liquidity are illustrated in a
simple framework in the Appendix, which stresses the existence of a basic trade-off between
scale and insurance: insurance is always costly, and reduces the investment equity
multiplier. Liquidity management must respond to the lack of coincidence between cash flows
and needs across states of nature and across time: as we have already discussed, risk
management aims at partially insuring the firm's liquidity position against insurable risks.
Similarly, asset-liability management (ALM) techniques try to restore some coincidence
between the timing of receipts and expenditures; thus, pension funds or life-insurance
companies have higher demands for securities delivering coupons 15 or 25 years ahead
than banks do. Again, these standard functions of financial officers would be hard to
rationalize in a classical economics world, in which firms could costlessly return to the capital
market to raise funds when they need to.
While banks have always transformed short-term borrowing into long-term loans, an
important pre-crisis development has been the financial sector's dramatic increase in
transformation. Commercial banks, investment banks and a number of other economically or
politically influential economic agents made themselves heavily exposed to refinancing in the
wholesale market and thereby to variations in interest rates. We will return to this
phenomenon in detail in Section 7.
Increased maturity transformation is only very indirectly captured in the Basel 1 (1988)
capital adequacy rules. The accord in appearance focused entirely on solvency. Yet it
touched on liquidity issues through the concepts of tier 1 (equity) and tier 2 (debt over 5 year
maturity, certain hybrid instruments). As we noted, medium- and long-term debt do not drain
cash the way short-term debt does; similarly, preferred equity provides the institution with
flexibility in meeting its liquidity demands. In this sense, the capital adequacy requirements
defined in 1988 mixed solvency and liquidity considerations.
c)

"Last taxi at the station".

The conceptual framework just sketched and developed in more detail in the Appendix
makes it clear that liquidity, which is necessarily expensive (otherwise all assets would be
liquid assets and there would be no transformation), is meant to be used up in case of
important need. Or, as Goodhart would put it, liquidity must be usable liquidity:
"The most salient metaphor and fable in prudential regulation is of the
weary traveler who arrives at the railway station late at night, and, to his
delight, sees a taxi there who could take him to his distant destination.
He hails the taxi, but the taxi driver replies that he cannot take him,
since local bylaws require that there must always be one taxi standing
ready at the station. Required liquidity is not true, usable liquidity. Nor
might I add, is required minimum capital fully usable capital from the
point of view of a bank. Principles of liquidity management, (and in my
view of capital adequacy also), ought to be applied in a much more
discretionary manner, pillar 2 rather than pillar 1." Goodhart (2008)
The discussion above however only half-responds to Goodhart's point. The dynamic
management of liquidity must account for the fact that drawing down one's liquidity position
leaves the institution exposed to a subsequent liquidity shock that could occur in the near
future (and so, that would not leave the institution with enough time to replenish its reserves).

5
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Economic theory has not yet offered much guidance regarding the repeated-liquidity-shock
conundrum. Nonetheless, very interesting contributions by Biais et al. (2007, 2008) and by
de Marzo-Fishman (2007 a,b) shed some light on Goodhart's puzzle. 10 Biais et al. for
example show that liquidity is not meant to be fully depleted even though it is indeed reduced
after an adverse shock. Discipline is ensured by downsizing when things go wrong, not by a
complete exposure to liquidity risk. The spirit of proportionality (for compulsory reserves as
well as for capital requirements) should therefore be interpreted as a commitment of
supervisors to promptly scale down the activities of banks that do not comply with these
regulations, unless shareholders are willing to recapitalize them.
3.2

Does a leverage/solvency ratio suffice?

Capital adequacy requirements, as we noted, emphasize solvency, although their use of
maturities in the definition of capital embodies some liquidity considerations beyond priority
ones (there is a close relationship, but no equivalence between maturity and priority). An
important regulatory issue is whether one should append a liquidity measure to the solvency
one. Put differently, can one trust the institutions to properly manage their liquidity, once
excess leverage has been controlled by the solvency requirement?
The answer to this question is not as straightforward as one would expect. As demonstrated
formally in the Appendix, theory tells us that institutions left on their own may well under- or
over-hoard liquidity, although I will later argue that the former is more likely in general, and
especially so in the banking context.
Underhoarding may result from a form of asset substitution, sacrificing insurance for size.
The institution may dispose of its liquid assets in order to expand the scale of its illiquid
investments. It thereby obtains less insurance, but it still receives some, due to the "softbudget-constraint" phenomenon: If the shock to be met is not too large, investors will be
willing to bring in new funds and bail out the institution. The availability of funding liquidity for
self-financing continuations can lead the bank to over-invest and under-insure.
Conversely, it may also be the case that the institution hoards large amounts of liquidity in
order to make sure that it will be able to finance even mediocre re-investments in the future.
This reverse form of asset substitution is linked to the anticipation of poor governance in the
future, in which investors will let management finance wasteful projects.
To most regulators, and certainly to observers of the current crisis, this overhoarding of
liquidity and associated excessive initial restraint in the investment in illiquid assets probably
feels like a theoretical nicety and a rather remote possibility. Yet, it is related to Jensen's
(1986) famous condemnation of free cash flows and his prediction of an eclipse of the
modern corporation. Jensen's view was that firms often reinvest in wasteful activities if they
have available liquidity. He argued that firms should be loaded up with debt, especially shortterm debt, whose coupons or principal's reimbursement would force them to disgorge its
available cash and to return to the capital market and justify new investments in order to
obtain new funds. Jensen thereby counted on abundant funding liquidity and assumed away
liquidity problems.
To sum up, our discussion so far tells us only that the liquidity choices cannot be completely
left to the bank, but, unless one is prepared to calibrate the theoretical analysis, it does not
indicate whether the surveillance of liquidity positions should take the form of a minimumliquidity ratio, a maximum-liquidity ratio, or both. Yet, I feel that the focus ought to be mostly
on the definition of a minimum liquidity requirement. First, overhoarding requires poor

10

See also Shin (2006).
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corporate governance, enabling management to make a discretionary use of the free cash
flow. While free cash flow problems do occur in practice, the case for underhoarding requires
no such assumption. Second, it may not be easy to verify overhoarding of liquid assets.
Third, and in the specific context of banking regulation, I venture into three possible extra
reasons for focusing on minimal liquidity requirements, all related to the idea that low liquidity
positions sacrifice insurance for scale and therefore represent an increase in risk:


Regulatory mandate. Banking regulators are particularly concerned about the debt
part of the balance sheet, and in particular about the welfare of retail depositors or
the deposit insurance fund. In this respect Mathias Dewatripont and I (1994)
developed the "representation hypothesis", according to which a major objective of
regulation is to make up for the inability (and suboptimality) of small depositorsinsurees in insurance companies, future pensioners in pension funds- to monitor
and exercise control over the institutions in which they invest their money. The
banking regulator, according to this view, represents the interests of the retail
depositors or, if the latter are insured, of the deposit insurance fund. This naturally
gives regulators a rather conservative (risk-averse) slant, as they may not care
much about the upside. Put differently, a lack of cushion is particularly hazardous for
debtholders.



Systemic risk. Potential domino effects of a banking failure have become very
prominent lately, and have inspired a number of bailout decisions (for example,
AIG's). Accordingly, there is an externality-based rationale for insisting on banks'
holding enough liquidity so as not to expose the rest of the financial system to a
widespread crisis. This argument is appealing but is not without its own limitations;
for, one may wonder whether liquidity hoarding is the most efficient instrument to
address systemic risk (we will discuss others), or even part of an optimal package of
instruments to control that risk.



Macroprudential regulation. As we will discuss in section 7, banking regulators
should protect themselves against widespread maturity mismatches. This offers a
clear rationale for minimum liquidity requirements.

4.

Market liquidity breakdowns

Market liquidity presumes that there are buyers on the other side. As the recent crisis has
demonstrated, this need not be the case. Commentators have accordingly mentioned the
possibility of a "buyers' strike", a surprising concept for economists used to the notion that
prices will adjust downward to the level at which buyers will be willing to acquire the assets.
This section considers three reasons why market liquidity may break down: adverse
selection (doubts about the quality of the assets), insufficient financial muscle of prospective
buyers, and regulatory arbitrage.
4.1

Securitization freezes and stigmas

a)

Securitization: the fundamentals

Securitization has recently, and understandably, come under attack. If it has been vastly
abused, one should not forget that securitization is a useful institution for three reasons: first,
it allows issuers to raise new cash and thereby undertake new projects. Securitization is then
about the certification of the quality of past activities; asymmetric information about the real
value of the return streams attached to the loans makes it difficult to offer the loan portfolio
as collateral against further borrowing. The securitization process, if it is accompanied by

7
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careful scrutiny by buyers, rating agencies or credit enhancers, certifies the quality of the
portfolio to the market and transforms otherwise illiquid assets into tradable ones. 11 If
properly performed (i.e. with the right incentives in place), this process thereby boosts the
institution’s liquidity position.
Second, and in an economy in which stores of value are in high demand, securitization
creates new stores of value; this effect is not to be neglected, as the demand for American
stores of value stemming from China and other countries with underdevelopped financial
markets or more generally a shortage of stores of value relative to their savings, made the
shortage of stores of value in the US more acute and made it particularly profitable to issue
new ones. 12 These two reasons (bank-level and macroeconomic level) fit well with de Soto’s
(2003) view that a major role of a financial system is to transform "dead capital" into "live
capital". Third, securitization may in some cases allow the institution to diversify its risk.
Securitization of assets is fraught with asymmetric information hazards: moral hazard to the
extent that issuers have little incentive to create high-value instruments if they anticipate to
sell a major stake in them; and adverse selection whenever the issuer is able to cherry pick
the loans to be put on the market. There is increasing evidence that asymmetric information
has played a key role in securitization of loans, e.g., Keys et al. (2008).
On the theoretical front, a mechanism design analysis of optimal securitization illustrates the
trade-off between the benefits of securitization  the transformation of illiquid claims into cash
 and its cost  the reduction in accountability. The optimal retention rate is highly assetdependent, making it hard to specify in a "one-size-fits-all" regulation a minimum amount to
be kept by the issuer- in 2008 the European Union required its banks to keep at least 5% (as
opposed to 15% in the initial proposal) of their securitized assets on their balance sheets. A
claim on a reliable local government can be almost entirely resold without creating moral
hazard, while a claim on a highly risky borrower or project may be fraught with moral hazard
and adverse selection. This makes it hard to design good, across the board regulations that
preserve proper incentives for the issuer while safeguarding the benefits of securitization.
Of course, these hazards are sharply reduced (and therefore the fraction to be securitized
can increase) if monitoring occurs at the securitization stage. At least two monitors play a
substantial role:


Rating agencies’ mandate is to assess the quality of the assets. We now understand
too well that the rating agencies did not play that role successfully in the case of
structured finance. Conflicts of interest, advice on how to structure portfolios (which
created marginal AAA claims where the market was expecting average AAA
tranches) and pre-rating assessments all concurred to mislead the market. The
realization that rating agencies were not doing their job raised new doubts about
forthcoming issuances, and contributed to the freeeze of the securitization market.
Rating agencies are auxiliaries of regulation; their being part of the regulatory
process, and the strong appetite for AAA-rated securities associated with the
regulation of banks (since Basel II), insurance companies and pension funds, boosts
their earnings. It is therefore logical that they be accountable to the prudential
regulators if their ratings are used for regulatory purposes.

11

The securitization process is very similar to the exit mechanism in venture capital deals. This exit mechanism
enables the venture capitalist to mobilize illiquid capital (part or all of his/her share in the venture), certify it
through an initial public offering or a sale to a knowledgeable buyer, and thereby avail himself/herself of new
funds to undertake new deals.

12

See Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008).
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Second, buyers themselves are meant to assess the quality of the claims. In an IPO
(which is a form of securitization), this is achieved through the issuance of equity 
an information-intensive claim  and by creating enough volume  for example
through the institution of drag-along rights  so as to attract interest in the issue. In
the case of Mortgage Backed Securities in the recent crisis, buyers did not monitor
very carefully the claims that they were acquiring. The reason for this is that they
may have been more interested in acquiring highly-rated securities (which carry only
small capital charges) than concerned about a low-probability, but large default.

b)

Securitization breakdowns

The process of market breakdown was well explained by Akerlof (1970) almost four decades
ago. In a market in which the quality of items for sale is known only to sellers, highest-quality
sellers are the first to withdraw from the market when doubts about asset quality lead to a
reduction in the market price. Their exit further lowers the price and triggers a further exit
wave by sellers with slightly lower quality assets, and so on. The market can quickly shift
from an efficient, high-volume one to a transactionless market.
Malherbe (2009) goes one step further and points out that market liquidity is affected not only
by news about the overall quality of assets (for example the likelihood that subprime
borrowers reimburse their loans, or the integrity of rating agencies), but also by the market's
perceived motives for selling. His theory makes the following interesting point: Suppose that
banks' exact liquidity positions are not known by the market (presumably because of the
difficulties involved in apprehending these liquidity positions and reviewed in section 2). If it
expected that banks hoard substantial liquidity, then the market is subject to much adverse
selection and breaks down: The motive for selling assets must be that they are of low quality,
not that the banks really need cash. Liquidity hoarding is then self-fulfilling, as banks cannot
count on securitization to raise cash and must hoard liquid assets. Conversely, a situation in
which banks are expected to hoard little liquidity reduces the adverse selection (banks need
to raise cash and are expected to also sell high-quality assets), and thus the prospect of a
well-functioning securitization market dispenses banks from hoarding costly liquidity.
A corollary of Malherbe's theory is that banks that want to depart from some of their assets
benefit from appearing fragile. This behavior resembles that of students' insisting in ads for
selling their car that they are graduating and moving out of town (“moving sale”), or that of
homeowners who go at great length to explain that they have exogenous reasons to sell their
house. But how can this prediction that ceteris paribus a bank would like to convey the
impression of illiquidity, be reconciled with the widespread observation that banks strive to
avoid the stigma of looking fragile? For example, banks, whenever feasible, try to avoid
borrowing at the discount window to avoid the associated stigma (in the same way that the
IMF's contingent credit lines have never been used by countries by fear of being
stigmatized). There is actually no contradiction between the two, due to the following
“Topsy-turvy principle”: Appearing illiquid is a plus for a bank that looks for market liquidity,
and a handicap for one that wants to tap funding liquidity.
c)

Endogenous information about asset quality and market breakdown

An interesting point of Malherbe’s analysis is that adverse selection and market breakdowns
are highly endogenous. In this respect, imperfect information about underlying liquidity
positions is only one of several drivers of this endogeneity. Another driver is endogenous
information acquisition about asset quality, the topic of recent contributions by Pagano-Volpin
(2009) and by Dang, Gorton and Holmström (2009).
It is often assumed that more information (increased transparency) reduces the competitive
advantage that sophisticated investors have over unsophisticated ones. This reasoning is
correct if what differentiates sophisticated investors is the ability to go and collect facts. It is
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flawed if sophistication refers to a higher ability to figure out what a given information actually
means (Pagano-Volpin 2009). Thus if what is at stake is the differential ability to process
information, more public information means higher asymmetries of information and therefore
more concern for unsophisticated buyers. Consequently, the seller of securities may not want
to disclose too much information in order to "reach" the unsophisticated buyers and obtain a
higher price for the securities in the primary market (as Pagano and Volpin show,
conclusions are different for the secondary market).
To discuss Dang et al’s (2009) contribution, it is useful to start with some reminders about
the impact of the information sensitivity of financial claims. It has long been understood
(Hirshleifer 1971) that in a world in which parties cannot contract on trades before receiving
information, the possibility of acquiring information jeopardizes the provision of otherwise
desirable insurance. This idea plays an important role for example in the debates on genetic
testing or mandatory health insurance coverage. That private information acquisition may
impact transactions was developed in financial economics in celebrated contributions by
Myers-Majluf (1984) and Gorton-Pennacchi (1990), 13 that share the notion of "lowinformation-intensity security". A low-information-intensity security is one for which the value
of information about the quality of the underlying asset is small. It is in a sense a "no-brainer".
Myers and Majluf, and a sizeable subsequent literature on security design, have argued that
issuers endowed with private information about the value of underlying assets will want to
follow a pecking order in the type of securities they issue. Safe debt is an instrument of
choice, as it does not give rise to adverse selection; with larger cash needs the issuer ought
to go for more and more “information-intensive” securities, even though the corresponding
markets are fraught with adverse selection: risky debt, hybrid securities, and, in last resort,
equity. The same idea explains why the collateral posted in repos has historically (although
not lately, with assets such as CDOs being used as collateral) been safe securities such as
Treasury securities.
Information intensity refers to the gain that a seller or buyer of this security can secure by
acquiring costly information about its value; for example, there is no gain acquiring
information about the value of a debt claim sufficiently covered by high-quality collateral, but
there are substantial gains in acquiring information about the value of shares in an initial
public offereing. 14 While this concept is context dependent (it depends on the price of the
security and therefore, inter alia, on whether other investors are acquiring information), it is a
very useful tool to understand the working of financial markets.
Analysing security design as well, but focusing on future rather than current adverse
selection, Gorton and Pennacchi make the point that different clienteles may be interested in
securities with different information intensities. Safe debt is very attractive to investors with
short horizons (in the sense of a high probability of turnover), as they will not “lose their shirt”
when they need to resell their securities, 15 by contrast, an investor holding shares in a
corporation is likely to face better informed traders when he resells his stake and will on
average lose money to them. This theory, which incidentally predicts an equity premium, also
resonates with common wisdom, as main street bank employees usually recommend bonds
to investors with short horizons and stocks for their retirement savings.

13

See Chapters 6 and 12 in Tirole (2006) for a review of this literature.

14

Note that Myers and Majluf’s pecking order is reversed in an IPO, as information-intensive securities are
issued so as to provide investors with incentives to acquire information about the value of assets in place and
thereby enable exit by the venture capitalist and possibly the managerial team without impairing their initial
incentives. On this see Aghion et al (2004).

15

For the same reason, stock market indices are more attractive than individual stocks for short-horizon
investors, as it is widely believed that there is less adverse selection on a large number of securities than on
individual ones: see Gorton-Pennacchi (1993) and Subrahmanyam (1991).
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Dang et al (2009) make a simple, but important observation: a security’s information intensity
varies with news accruing about the quality of underlying asset or borrower. Consider for
instance a debt claim. As long as the underlying assets pay off nicely or the borrower
remains solvent, the ex post return on the debt claim is constant. So additional ex ante
information about the quality of the underlying asset (or about the borrower’s solvency) is
almost useless; that is, the return on a debt claim is relatively insensitive to additional
information when (publicly known) prospects are favorable and so its reimbursement is pretty
secure (the option is well into the money). By contrast, when doubts about the quality of
assets or the borrower’s solvency are raised, it becomes profitable for potential sellers and
buyers of the security to go and collect information about the real value. In a nutshell, the
market for the security switches from a liquid, symmetric information market to an illiquid,
low-volume one in which adverse selection and suspicions about the motives for trade are
paramount.
Dang et al’s analysis, which is depicted in Figure 2, implies that institutions should be wary of
market liquidity (the option to resell assets) as a means to cover their liquidity needs. Not
only is it the case that bad news about the quality of assets may lower the resale price; but
precisely in that event, the secondary market will be fraught with adverse selection and will
dry up. This double whammy prediction fits well with the recent episode, in which the
securitization market, the repo market and a number of other collaterized markets froze. 16

Figure 2: Dang-Gorton-Holmström's double whammy argument
4.2

Local liquidity, financial muscle and fire sales

Common sense suggests that asset prices are likely to be low when lots of assets are for
sale in the market. Standard (market micro-structure) explains this through the presence of
adverse selection: a high volume of sell orders suggests that sellers/ speculators are
pessimistic about prospects (Kyle 1985). Thus, the demand curve for securities is not
perfectly elastic.
This theory does not seem to account for fire sale episodes such as the one we just
witnessed. Somehow, one feels that, beyond the adverse selection problem discussed in
section 4.1, there is also a limit to arbitrage. Potential buyers don’t have enough financial

16

It also responds to the possibility – related to the previous discussion of Malherbe – that asset markets should
become more liquid when lots of institutions are in distress and so the motive for selling is unlikely to be
adverse selection (Uhlig 2009). Uhlig proposes an alternative theory for why markets may freeze when bad
news accrues; this theory is based on the assumption that investors are "uncertainty averse" – they are willing
to pay the value corresponding to the lower bound of the support of possible distributions.
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muscle to acquire the assets. Or, to use a term coined by Bengt Holmström, “local liquidity” is
limited.
Thus, a now sizeable literature has investigated institutions’ incentives to hoard liquidity for
the purpose of acquiring assets in distress from other institutions in the future. A simple, but
important point is that, if liquidity is costly, then assets must be expected to trade in the
secondary market at a price below their fundamental value at the date of secondary trading;
for, the wedge between fundamental value and price in the secondary market is what gives
institutions ex-ante incentives to hoard liquidity. Otherwise, institutions would sacrifice return
and would be better off investing only in illiquid assets and not hoarding liquidity.
An important early analysis of fire sales is due to Allen and Gale (e.g.,1994, 1998). Their
analysis is couched in a Diamond-Dybvig (1983)-style model of consumer liquidity demand.
Imagine that today investors separately invest in liquid (short-term) assets, that yields a safe
return at the intermediate date, and higher-yield illiquid (long-term) assets. Tomorrow a
fraction of consumers will want to consume; to this purpose, they will use the returns on the
short-term assets and also will resell their long-term assets. The focus of the 1994 paper is
on how much these long-term assets will fetch in the secondary market. There is aggregate
uncertainty, in that the number of consumers who desire to consume early is random. The
clearing condition in the secondary market for the long-term asset is that consumers who
desire to consume late use the proceeds of their short-term assets to purchase the long-term
assets unwanted by the consumers who desire to consume early. The former- the buyershave limited cash on hand, and so the asset price decreases when more consumers- the
sellers- want to dispose of their long-term assets in the market. This phenomenon is called
“cash-in-the-market pricing” by Allen and Gale.
Allen and Gale later allow intermediaries to pool liquidity and to offer non-contingent deposit
contracts. The lower the resale price, the more long-term assets the intermediary needs to
sell in order to honour its commitment towards depositors. This, together with the
intermediaries’ limited liability, adds a discontinuity in the resale price of the secondary asset.
If the resale price is too low, the intermediary goes bankrupt and then its entire holdings of
long-term assets are dumped on the market, creating a “crisis”.
The literature on financial muscle more generally emphasizes the role of contract
incompleteness (the absence of ex ante pooling arrangements for sharing liquidity) and ex
post secondary markets for assets. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (for example 2003 a, b)
have in a string of papers emphasized the scope for under hoarding of liquidity in
environments where intact institutions’ financial muscle exerts positive externalities on
distressed institutions.
But liquidity may also be over hoarded for rent seeking purposes. In Holmström-Tirole (2009,
Chapter 7), institutions hoard costly liquidity in order to overbid rivals in the market for
distressed assets. A reinterpretation of such “vulture behaviors” has institutions with cash
playing a waiting game and refusing to buy distressed assets at fire-sale prices in order to
buy them at still a lower price in the future. This behavior may have taken place in the recent
crisis, when cash-rich institutions accumulated reserves at the central banks rather than
lending their extra cash to, or buying assets from distressed institutions. 17
4.3

Regulatory arbitrage

The notion of market breakdown hinges on the idea that some gains from trade are not
realized. But what if there are actually no gains from trade between the two sides of the

17

It is hard, of course, to know whether this behavior was motivated by a waiting game or by the fear that they
themselves might need cash in the near future.
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transaction? Diamond and Rajan’s "asset substitution theory" (2009) offers an alternative
perspective for the recent freeze of some markets. In a nutshell, a transfer of assets from
distressed institutions to deep-pocket ones would enable the former to refinance and would
benefit the society as a whole; it may however not be in the interest of the two protagonists in
the transaction, the buyer and the seller. Diamond and Rajan's idea is that a third party not
involved in the transaction, the taxpayer, would benefit from the trade, which would make the
government’s stake in the distressed bank (for example, the deposit insurance fund’s stake)
more secure. But the buyer and the seller do not internalize this gain. In the absence of
bilateral gains from trade, the management of the distressed bank refuses to sell assets at a
low price in the hope of good news.
To illustrate such "gambling for resurrection" in a rather stark way, suppose that the
distressed bank owes a liability of 8 to depositors (or deposit insurance fund). It owns an
asset of nominal value 10. However bad news accrue, that indicates that this asset will pay
off 10 with probability 1/2 and 0 otherwise. Information is symmetric, and so sellers would be
willing to buy at price p=5. But the intact bank is better off holding to this asset in the hope
that it recovers and enables it to make a profit of 10-8=2. Because the depositors' claim is a
debt claim, the distressed bank prefers to keep its call option. This example of course is too
simplistic; to make it more interesting one can add a benefit from the distressed bank's
enjoying some liquidity, such as refinancing new projects. But as long as the distressed bank
benefits substantially from hanging on to its call on asset recovery, the asset market will
remain inactive.
This example illustrates the more general point that regulatory arbitrage may interfere with
markets. Another illustration is provided by the recent relaxation of accounting standards,
enabling financial institutions to return to historical cost accounting under certain
circumstances. When historical levels are allowed as measures of asset values, institutions
are incentivized to sell winners (and then record them at their market value) and to keep
losers so as to avoid recognizing losses. 18 This reluctance to sell losers can lead to a freeze
of markets that would operate normallly in the absence of regulation.

5

Economics of domino effects

An institution's liquidity and solvency may be jeopardized if the solvency of other institutions it
has lent to is compromised. This section reviews what we know and don't know about
systemic risk.
5.1

Centralized vs. decentralized trading

One of the major regulatory failures of this decade has been the lenient attitude of regulators
toward OTC markets, or more precisely toward the involvement of strategic players (players
whose stability is crucial to the economy) in these markets. For instance, AIG's holding
company, an investment bank, was rescued by fear that a (magnified) Lehman Brothers
effect would result from bankruptcy. The traditional view of prudential regulation, the
protection of depositors, has recently left center stage, and systemic risk has become by far
authorities’ main concern.
It is natural for financial institutions to lend to each other. Such lending may smooth liquidity
positions; for example a bank or mutual fund may have incurred substantial withdrawals or

18

See, e.g., Dewatripont-Tirole (1994) for a discussion of gains trading.
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redemptions while others have not and thereby hold excess liquidity. Similarly, risk
management commands to enter interest rate and FX swap agreements, or CDS contracts. 19
This pooling of risk and handling of asynchronicities however gives rise to a new type of risk,
the counterparty risk associated with cross exposures. Accordingly, mutual exposures raise
concerns for the system’s financial stability.
There are two polar views on how cross exposures are to be handled. In a centralized
approach, transactions between two parties involve a clearinghouse acting as a counterparty
to the trade. In a decentralized approach, epitomized by the OTC markets, no-one interferes
with the cross-exposures and the two parties are free to take as much counterparty risk/ set
as little collateral requirement (i.e. low haircuts on the collateralized assets) as they like.
Hybrid systems combine centralization with cross exposures. For example, a large value
intra-day payment system may be centralized, but lets each participant set bilateral overdraft
ceilings, which are akin to bilateral credit lines. The bilateral overdraft ceilings are then
aggregated by the system to define an individualized overall cap on each member’s intraday
overdraft. In case of default of a participant at the end of the day, a loss sharing formula has
members share the losses of the failing bank proportionally to the overdrafts granted to the
failing bank. See the analytical framework in Rochet-Tirole (1996b), which combines the
properties of privately held net-settlement system CHIPS 20 and Federal Reserve Banks’
gross-settlement system Fedwire. The latter is centralized and involves no cross exposures
among participants, but overdafts (priced and subject to a net debit cap) with respect to the
Fed. The former by contrast allows its members to give each other intraday credit facilities.
Conversely, in some extreme cases, decentralization may not imply cross exposures. The
recent regime of government guarantees on interbank lending is a case in point. Under
guaranteed interbank lending, a loan from bank A to bank B is de facto a loan from the
government to bank B. This raises the question of why the government does not lend
directly.
Centralization should be encouraged, as the benefits of decentralization can be duplicated
on centralized platforms. The latter have two main benefits:


Transparency. In a decentralized system, parties know their cross-exposures with
their counterparties, but they have little clue about their counterparties’ exposures to
third parties. The Lehman Brothers episode is a case in point, which later led the US
authorities to rescue the AIG holding (which was involved in $440 bn in protection
contracts) and some other key financial players by fear of propagation. By contrast,
the collapse of the large hedge fund Amaranth in 2006 had very little impact on
financial markets, as the hedge fund was trading in well-organized (mainly energy)
centralized markets..21 Transparency is important also for the regulators, as
interconnexions currently make it almost impossible to figure out what the real
solvency of individual institutions is.
To be certain, regulators could demand transparency of positions even in
decentralized markets. However, the complexity posed to regulators by this solution
is daunting. OTC products are often very complex objects whose covenants and

19

Shin (2009) further argues that mutual exposures arise naturally in long chains of intermediation, such as
mortgage pool – ABS issuer – securities firm – commercial bank – money market fund.
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Clearing House Interbank Payments System, a net settlement system.
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In September 2006, Amaranth lost $6 bn out of the $9 bn it was managing. By contrast, the direct losses from
Lehman's failure were relatively modest (net payouts on its CDS contracts amounted to $5 bn); but that failure
had a major macroeconomic impact and completely changed the IMF global growth prospects (Haldane
2009). Cecchetti (2007) compares the failure of Amaranth with that of LTCM (1998), whose interest rate
swaps were not traded on an exchange.
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implications thereof are understood by only a handful of experts. Furthermore, the
chain of counterparty risks remains rather opaque.
Centralization of trades through a central clearing counterparty of course is no
panacea. Poorly monitored, a central clearing counterparty might take on substantial
direct or indirect counterparty risk vis-à-vis the members. It might thereby become
yet another “too-big-to-fail institution”. It is therefore important to apply careful
prudential regulation to such parties. This brings me to a second desirable move.


Standardized products. There are substantial social benefits to the trading of
financial products in liquid markets. The existence of market prices in particular
allows the central clearing counterparty to be more accurate in the dynamic
adjustment of its margin calls. And, crucially, it allows supervisors to better monitor
the solvency of central clearing counterparties and therefore to reduce the likelihood
of a bailout of such institutions. The standardization of products, which could be
promoted through a sufficiently strong differentiation in capital charges for regulated
entities, 22 comes at a cost as regulated entities will find it more expensive to provide
their customers with finely tailored (bespoke) products. But many useful derivative
products (exchange and interest rate swaps, commodity insurance, credit default
swaps, etc.) can be or already are standardized. The loss in granularity in my view is
second order compared to the externality currently inflicted upon society by current
arrangements.



Multilateral netting. Decentralized markets allow netting between two institutions. By
contrast, centralized ones enable multilateral netting, thereby reducing collateral
requirements. If A owes money to B, who owes money to C, who owes money to A,
bilateral netting won’t save on collateral as each pair’s relationship invoves a large
net exposure. Centralized systems are a priori superior to decentralized ones, as
they can mimic the benefits of bilateral deals while not exhibiting their flaws. I have
already mentioned the possibility of embodying transparent mutual overdraft
(exposures) in a centralized system. Duffie and Zhu (2009) analyse potential costs
of central clearing platforms. The first is the proliferation of platforms (for example
there are currently two approved CDS central clearing counterparties in the US and
five in Europe); unless these institutions are connected through cross-margining
agreements, the resulting outcome may be very costly in collateral if crossexposures are widespread and so players must be active on multiple platforms.
Second, the desirability of netting also applies cross-products. One may net a CDS
contract with an interest-rate swap contract. The challenge then is to allow
competition between well-organized and secure clearinghouses without losing the
benefits of netting and collateral pooling.

5.2

Regulatory reforms

The recent explosive growth of OTC derivative markets has added much opacity and can be
viewed as a form of regulatory evasion, in which cross-exposures were underpriced in terms
of capital requirements. “Too interconnected to fail” unregulated institutions were rescued at
the expense of the taxpayer; although this was not the first time (recall the rescue of the
LTCM hedge fund in 1998), the magnitude of the recent bailouts of unregulated institutions is
alarming. Such institutions were able to have their cake and eat it too. They were
unregulated and at the same time could avail themselves of an access to a safety net built on

22

There is no reason to prevent non-regulated entities from trading in non-standard products or for that matter in
non-transparent markets.
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taxpayer money, which allowed them to borrow from other parties without being carefully
monitored by the latter. Relatedly, and importantly, both markets and regulators have little
information about the consequences of pulling the plug on an institution. The losses triggered
by Lehman's failure turned out to be relatively modest, but the bankruptcy of this institution
had major consequences on the functioning of the markets worldwide. Opacity thus has a
major cost for markets and not only for taxpayers.
Is the solution to enlarge the scope of regulation? In a sense, the scope has already been
enlarged, with large investment banks becoming retail banks, which makes them subject to
prudential regulation. Some oversight will be imposed on hedge funds, or more generally
“Tier 1 institutions” that are deemed to expose the financial system to systemic risk. This
however is likely to prove very insufficient for two reasons. First, regulators are understaffed
and have a hard time overseeing institutions (retail banks, insurance companies, pension
funds) with small depositors. Extending the scope of regulation will require a substantial
upward adjustment in their budget. Second, and before you know it, Pacific Gas and Electric,
General Electric and Boeing will become hedge funds if the existing hedge funds are subject
to a strict regulation. The lack of clear critera for defining Tier 1 institutions and the potential
migration of risk taking could imply that the entire private sector would need to be subject to
regulatory reporting.
In my view, a better approach is to return to the standard rationale for prudential regulation
and to delineate a regulated sphere (retail banks, insurance companies, pension funds,
broker-dealers) in which the regulators defend the interests of unsophisticated investors.
Interaction between this regulated sphere and the rest of the economy should take place in
standardized products and on approved clearinghouses, or else should be subject to
substantial capital charges. 23 There is of course a cost to this solution, as OTC markets allow
contracts to be finely tailored to individual circumstances. However, it has become clear that
contracts in OTC markets often have been motivated more by the prospect of fees and by
underpriced capital requirements than by first-order hedging benefits. Innovation in financial
markets could in part migrate to the development of standardized products beyond the
existing ones, so that most of the participants could cover their major risks. The loss in terms
of market completeness then seems dwarfed by the misbehavior and huge bailouts that
resulted from OTC markets,
5.3

Economics of contagion

A large literature (e.g. Allen-Gale 2000a, Kiyotaki-Moore 1997) describes how a small shock
to one institution or to the economy may propagate in a financial system with given crossexposures. For example, domino effects are shown to be related to the completeness of the
structure of claims (Allen-Gale). This literature also illustrates the opaqueness associated
with bilateral exposures. As Caballero and Simsek (2009) note, in order to know the health of
its counterparties, a participant in financial markets must also know the health of its
counterparties’ counterparties, and so on. Getting informed about the solvency of the entire
financial system is daunting for participants regulators. 24 Caballero and Simsek show how
deteriorating conditions may make information processing unmaneageable to banks and
result in a panic (a generalized withdrawal/flight to quality equilibrium).

23

This view is gaining traction, although it is still unclear whether the higher capital charges that will apply to
customized contracts will reflect the price of risk.

24

Furthermore, from the Dang-Gorton-Holmström analysis mentionned earlier, we know that participants’
information acquisition will in general respond to market circumstances.
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While this literature obtains a number of useful insights, my view is that one should still build
on it in order to derive policy implications. A “Lucas critique” of this literature is that one
cannot assume that the network of cross exposures is unaffected by the regulatory
environment or by the underlying risk structure. Different environments will give rise to
different mutual exposures and contagion possibilities. Recall our discussion of intraday
payment systems. There, the possibility of domino effects has been taken on board for
decades, and centralized systems with very visible and limited cross exposures have been
put in place. Put differently, the parties (institutions, regulators) are cognicent of the
possibility of domino effects and have accordingly limited cross exposures and made them
transparent. Conversely, the private sector has quickly identified regulatory loopholes in the
treatment of OTC markets and has reacted accordingly by developing bilateral exposures.
Relatedly, one must ask what bilateral exposures are all about. There are two potential
rationales with rather distinct normative implications: regulatory evasion, as discussed above,
and mutual monitoring. By “mutual monitoring” I have in mind mutual monitoring of the quality
of assets or the solvency of institutions more than investments in learning the bilateral
exposures of various participants in the financial systems (such investments are socially
wasteful, as the exposures could be cheaply read from positions in centralized exchanges, if
the latter exist). Ignoring regulatory evasion, bilateral exposures can be motivated only by the
existence and the use of decentralized information not held by a central agent (say a central
bank or a regulator). As we noted above, one can wonder about the decentralized nature of
government guaranteed interbank loans, when the latter reflect no decentralized information
due to the guarantee. In the absence of government guarantee or of a prospect of
government bailout, a bilateral exposure should really be about saying: “I have information
that makes me trust you, and so I’m willing to accept the corresponding counterparty risk”. As
argued in Rochet-Tirole (1996a), this monitoring view has implications for capital adequacy
rules (or margining rules in exchanges). Finally, it bears emphasizing that, as some payment
systems illustrate, the use of decentralized information is not inconsistent with a centralized
approach.

6.

Aggregate liquidity

6.1

Is there sufficient inside liquidity? 25

Let us start with a basic question, that of the sufficiency of inside liquidity at the aggregate
level. We have seen that in the presence of agency costs, the (Arrow-Debreu and ModiglianiMiller) feasibility of "financing as you go" by resorting to the capital market does not hold at
the individual firm level; because investors cannot grab the entire benefits associated with
their investment, they tend to ration the financing they extend to the firm. However, "financing
as you go" might hold "on average" at the macroeconomic level, and so the corporate sector
might not need outside stores of value to finance desirable re-investments. We therefore
investigate the sufficiency of inside liquidity in an example; the conclusions however are very
general.
Capital insurance at the institution’s level
Consider a representative entrepreneur and three dates (and no discounting between these
three dates): t = 0,1, 2 (see Figure 3 for a summary of the timing). At date 0, the
entrepreneur has a project, for which she must invest 10, but she has wealth only equal to 8;

25

This subsection follows very closely Tirole (2008).
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she must therefore go to the capital market in order to finance this investment. The
investment, if made at date 0, does not generate any revenue at date 1; actually with
probability 1/2, an overrun (a "liquidity shock") of 20 arises, that must be covered if the
project is to go on and produce income at date 2, otherwise the project is liquidated and
yields no income. With probability 1/2, there is no overrun and therefore no extra expense at
date 1. At date 2, revenue accrues (provided that the overrun, if any, has been covered at
date 1). The total proceeds, 30, are shared between investors and entrepreneur; namely, the
pledgeable income, that is the maximum amount that can credibly be promised to investors,
is only 12. 26
Note first that financing the project and covering the overrun if it arises is viable for the
investors, even though they cannot put their hands on the entire pie: recalling that the
interest rate is by assumption equal to 0, total (date 0 plus date 1) investor outlay is equal to
date-2 revenue on investors' claim on the firm: (10  8)  (1/2)(20) = 12 .

Figure 3
However, the "finance as you go" strategy is not sustainable: suppose that the entrepreneur
borrows 2, against claims on date 2 income, so as to just be able to cover the investment at
date 0, and counts on returning to the capital market at date 1 in case of overrun. When the
overrun arises, the capital market won't be willing to supply more than the maximum
revenue, 12, that investors can grab at date 2 (to obtain 12, a restructuring of claims through
a renegotiation with initial claimholders  who obtain 0 if the firm goes bankrupt at date 1  is
needed if new investors are brought in). Therefore investors aren't willing to bring in the 20
that are necessary to withstand the liquidity shock faced by the firm.
The entrepreneur must therefore plan and hoard liquidity. In this simple example, there are
various ways of doing so, but a “reasonable'' one may go as follows: the firm contracts with a
bank for a line of credit equal to 20. If this line is drawn, the bank becomes the senior creditor
and therefore obtains 12 at date 2. The bank in exchange demands at date 0 a commitment
fee equal to 4 = (1/2)(20  12) ; it makes money if the credit line is not drawn, and loses
money if the firm faces an overrun. This is indeed the nature of a credit line: there would be
no reason to contract in advance on a credit line if at date 1 the bank were always happy to
provide the funds; it is precisely because lending is a money-losing operation at date 1 that it
must be pre-arranged. The other investors must bring in 2 (the investment cost minus the
entrepreneur's contribution to it) plus the commitment fee, so 6 in total. They are willing to do
so, as they get back (1/2)(12) = 6 .

26

For example, the 18 left to the entrepreneur might correspond to an incentive payment provided to the
entrepreneur (or more generally the firm's insiders) to curb moral hazard. That amount may also include the
entrepreneur's perks and prestige from office. Last, it could also represent money that is diverted toward other
activities (affiliated companies, investment in human capital that will be operative in other, future activities).
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This example is straightforwardly reinterpreted in terms of a choice of maturity structure.
Keep the same numbers, except that the investment cost is now 20 instead of 10 and that
the investment returns a safe short-run profit equal to 10 at date 1. A short-term debt d=10
forces the firm to disgorge the short-term profit and makes up for the increased investment
cost from the point of view of investors. Alternatively, the entrepreneur can do without a
credit line, but secure liquidity through a longer maturity structure, in which the short-term
debt is only d=2, provided that the firm can commit not to misinvest its liquidity when it does
not need it. 27 Investors then receice -12 + (10+12)/2 + (2)/2 = 0.
Aggregate liquidity
This is all well, but we haven't addressed the “macroeconomic question'': where will the bank
find the 20 that it has committed to bring in if the credit line is drawn? Imagine that there are
lots of such entrepreneurs in this economy. Entrepreneurs are identical at date 0. As we
observed, given that the firm-idiosyncratic events of liquidity shocks are independent and so
there is no macroeconomic uncertainty, exactly half of the firms face an overrun.
The claim (which is entirely general, and so not specific to this very special example) 28 is that
the private sector produces enough inside liquidity to efficiently withstand liquidity shocks that
it should withstand; another way of rephrasing the same point is that if one introduces a store
of value (a Treasury bond, say) delivering 1 at date 1 (or 2, it does not matter), this store of
value will trade at price 1 at date 0: it won't embody any liquidity premium for supplying
liquidity services, or equivalently, its interest rate will be equal to the economy wide rate
(here 0); there is no risk-free rate puzzle.
To see this, let the banks invest the 4 they receive in commitment fees in ordinary claims on
other firms. If banks are diversified, the per-firm value of the resulting portfolio is
(4/6)(1/2)(12) = 4 at date 1. To honor its credit line commitments, the bank needs
(1/2)(20  12) = 4 , so everything is in order. Note that this arrangement requires some
prudential supervision: the bank in general would make more profit by selecting subsets of
firms for which liquidity shocks are correlated as this strategy guarantees a large profit when
such shocks do not arise, and otherwise does not expose the bank, which is protected by
limited liability. 29
Matters are quite different in the presence of macroeconomic shocks. To take an extreme
case, suppose that with probability 1/2 all entrepreneurs face a cost overrun simultaneously;
that is, the liquidity shocks are perfectly correlated. Then there is no way investors are going
to put in 20 per firm at date 1: their claims on date 2 income are only 12 per firm, and they
cannot be forced to disgorge 20 even if their portfolios of claims on the firms are seized.
Somehow for the efficient allocation to be sustainable there must exist stores of values in
quantity at least equal to 8 per firm.
To sum up, in the absence of macroeconomic shock, the corporate sector as a whole in principle
produces enough inside liquidity to meet liquidity shocks it wants to withstand, even though
there is insufficient inside liquidity at the firm level. We have stressed that the adequacy of
inside liquidity in the aggregate hinges on an efficient dispatching of available liquidity toward

27

See Holmström-Tirole (2009, Chapter 3) for an analysis of optimal contracting when the firm may re-invest
unneeded liquidity into less profitable projects.

28

See Holmström-Tirole (1998 and 2009). The key assumption for this proposition to hold is that the corporate
sector be a net borrower. Woodford (1990) analyzed the case of a corporate sector that is a net lender; there
is then always a shortage of inside liquidity, even in the absence of macroeconomic shock.

29

With perfect correlation of shocks in its portfolio, the bank makes 8 per firm in the absence of overrun and 0 in
case of overrun, instead of 0.
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those firms in (moderate) need of cash. This is accomplished by pooling the available
liquidity at the level of financial intermediaries, who then redispatch the liquidity through a
mechanism akin to credit lines; by contrast, self provision of liquidity, under which each firm
hoards liquidity for its own purposes, leads to a waste and therefore a potential shortage of
liquidity, as firms that end up awash with cash do not lend it to those with a shortage of
liquidity.
There is a shortage of inside liquidity when the economy is hit by aggregate shocks. Holding
the “stock index'' (a portfolio of shares of the firms) does not bring any useful liquidity to firms
or financial intermediaries: in the simple-minded example given above, the value of this stock
index falls to 0 when the economy is hit by a shock: all firms are then valueless. The stock
index has value in the absence of shock, but this value serves no liquidity purpose as firms
don't need liquidity in this circumstances. Put differently, the stock index does not allow firms
to diversify and create a store of value that can be resold in case of liquidity needs. Thus, the
stock index is not a liquid security in the macroeconomic sense, even though it is perfectly
liquid in the microeconomic sense.
6.2

Public supply of liquidity

The state can provide (outside) liquidity by issuing Treasury securities and by using the
future tax income to back up the reimbursements. In our stylized example for instance, the
state can issue bonds at date 0 and promise to pay out at date 1. 30 There are of course limits
on what the state can do: first, the reimbursement through taxation introduces both
substantial deadweight losses and credibility problems when national debt reaches high
levels. Second, the taxation of consumers generates social costs when consumers have
liquidity needs of their own. In particular, as employees of the firms, they may face hardships
precisely when firms are in need of liquidity.
The fundamental feature of public provision of liquidity is that the state should redistribute
from consumers to corporations when the latter face pressing liquidity needs. So it does in
practice, through a variety of instruments from open market operations to the discount
window, from fiscal policies to non-indexed payroll taxes and deposit insurance premia. The
recent events have illustrated this large-scale support: monetary bailout, banking
recapitalizations, asset repurchases (as proposed, but not realized, by the Paulson and
Geithner plans), relaxation of accounting standards (suspension of fair value accounting),
underpriced state guarantees in interbank and other markets, and so forth. I am not
necessarily approving of each and every countercyclical policy, but their general thrust is
sound.
Ideally, the state should be issuing "state-contingent liquidity", i.e. liquidity that delivers cash
only during recessions. Contingent claims of this kind are usually implicit rather than explicit;
an exception is the sale by the Federal Reserve of contingent access to the discount window
in the context of the potential Y2K computer bug; in this case, a well-defined event of liquidity
shortage (the potential problems with computers at the turn of the millennium) was identified
and contingent claims accordingly issued by the central bank. But defining precisely a
liquidity shortage in advance is rather hard and injections of liquidity remain for that reason
by and large discretionary.
The state has a comparative advantage in providing support in low-probability events. The
private sector’s self provision of liquidity (the production of stores of value) takes place before
the state of nature is revealed. If macroeconomic shortages of liquidity are rare, then private

30

Or date 2 for that matter.
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provision of liquidity is very costly. By contrast, the state can bring in funds ex post on a
contingent basis.
Another theoretical suggestion 31 is that liquidity premia attached to risk-free rate assets are
signals of the scarcity of aggregate liquidity at the various maturities and therefore are a
useful guide for the issuing of government securities, both in level (total public debt) and in
structure (choice of maturities); for example, a very low long rate signals substantial
shortages of long-term stores of value, and therefore social gains to issuing long-term
Treasury securities. A case in point is the issuing by HM Treasury of long-term bonds in
reaction to the low rates triggered by the 2005 reform of pension funds requirements in the
United Kingdom.
The public provision of liquidity is motivated by a missing contract between consumers and
the corporate sector (or more generally by missing contracts between entities that turn out to
need cash and those who turn out to have sufficiently). A similar idea is exploited by
Lorenzoni (2008), who analyzes fire sales. Suppose that the corporate sector invests in
assets (say real estate), that it can sell to consumers in a macroeconomic downturn, when it
needs cash. If it has to sell to consumers at a low price, it won’t be able to generate enough
cash in bad states of nature. A Pareto improvement could be achieved in which consumers
would “agree” to pay higher prices in recessions in exchange of some insurance premium
paid in booms; put differently some asset price stabilization would be desirable.
6.3

Asset overvaluation and fair value accounting

The overall shortage of stores of value sheds some interesting light on the role of asset
bubbles on macroeconomic activity. In a standard rational bubble framework, bubbles
compete with securities issued by corporations for the consumers’ savings and thereby
crowd out productive investment (Tirole 1985) in the same way public debt also crowds out
private investment (Diamond 1985). This need no longer be the case if corporations need
stores of value to adjust to the asynchronicity between cash availability and cash needs
(Farhi-Tirole 2009a) . An asset bubble, by inflating the volume of stores of value, fuels
growth. It is more likely to exist, the wider the gap between value and pledgeable income,
that is the less developed financial markets are (one polar case is the neo-classical model,
with its perfect financial markets, i.e. the absence of gap between value and pledgeable
income). When the bubble crashes, the economy contracts. 32
This analysis shows that bubbles, if they boost investment by increasing corporate access to
stores of value, still are a very imperfect form of liquidity for two reasons. The first is obvious:
bubbles may burst, so their owner cannot fully count on realizing their full value. Second, and
more interestingly, bubbles burst “at the wrong time”. The burst of the bubble creates a
recession and raises interest rates, making refinancing more difficult. Conversely, an
otherwise generated recession makes it more difficult to sustain a bubble. Overall, the picture
is one of a negative correlation between asset values and liquidity needs. So it is precisely
when the corporate sector needs the money most that it is not available. Consequently,
bubbles trade at a (liquidity) discount relative to the value embodying the probability that the
bubble bursts.

31

See Holmström-Tirole (2001).

32

Another worthy point is that bubbles are consistent with dynamic efficiency in the presence of non-pledgeable
income.
For independent work on the impact of asset bubbles on economic activity, see Kocherlakota (2009). Kiyotaki
and Moore (2008) develop a monetary economy framework in which the issuance of money to satisfy the
economic agents’ demand for easy-to-resell stores of value improves welfare.
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This discussion is related to the current debates on asset price stability mandates, on the
one hand, and on fair value accounting, on the other hand. The dominant view, associated
with Greenspan and Bernanke in particular, has been that even if one could recognize an
asset price bubble, monetary policy should not react to it unless there is a concern for
inflation (e.g., Bernanke 2002, Bernanke-Gertler 2000, 2001). This view has been called into
question in the wake of the recent crisis, in which an asset price bubble combined with fair
value accounting boosted the institutions’ solvency and encouraged investment (fair value
accounting has been perceived to be an amplifying mechanism in the downturn as well,
forcing institutions to resell assets in reaction to reduced solvency, triggering further asset
price decreases and thereby further sales).
It is hard to rejoice over the recent tinkering with reclassification, a substantial relaxation of
fair value accounting, even if one understands its motivation. Fair value accounting, despite
its drawbacks, has clear benefits. In case of a difficulty (“ex post”), it forces a bank to
recognize its losses and to engage in deleveraging. “Ex ante”, the prospect of having to
downsize if assets lose some of their value reduces the attractiveness of bad investments. In
a nutshell, fair value accounting is an important disciplining device.
But, for all its merits, fair value accounting requires some adjustments in our regulatory
context. To see this, let’s return to asset bubbles. We saw that bubbles are a very imperfect
store of value because they may burst and furthermore they tend to burst at the wrong time.
This “double whammy” makes a case for not using market value, as the corresponding
assets hardly serve as a cushion.
This discussion is also linked to the debate on countercyclical capital adequacy
requirements. Until recently, it was admitted in regulatory circles that capital requirements
should not vary with the cycle; the fear has always been that regulators would face intense
lobbying by the industry if they had discretion to adjust the Cooke ratio or any other
regulatory rule. If anything, capital requirements lately have been procyclical with the advent
of fair value accounting. Yet economic theory provides arguments in favor of countercyclical
capital adequacy requirements, that would increase during booms in order to constitute a
stronger cushion for bad times. 33
One rationale for countercyclical capital adequacy requirements (CARs) is the loanable funds
effect. It stems from the fact that regulated institutions are central to the provision of credit to
the real sector, and in particular to small and medium size enterprises. In a banking boom,
such as the one experienced before the subprime crisis, the higher availability of loans to the
real sector driven by the high level of bank capital lowers the banks’ markup on inframarginal
loans and induces a shift toward marginal and less profitable loans. These shifts call for a
bigger cushion, i.e. a higher equity over assets ratio. Conversely, adverse macroeconomic
shocks deplete banks’ capital positions and, under invariant CARs, impose deleveraging
upon them. As a consequence the spread between interest rates faced by consumers and
those demanded by banks increases. While this “capital scarcity rent” allows banks to slowly
reconstitute their capital, the shortage of loanable funds also creates a credit crunch, which
hits the financially most fragile firms, often the smaller ones (Holmström-Tirole 1997).
Adjusting the CAR to the overall capital condition of the banking sector stabilizes interest
rates and access to credit.
Another potential rationale for contercyclical CAR is the insurance effect (Dewatripont-Tirole
1994). It is related to the fact that the Basel rules make no distinction between idiosynchratic
shocks, for which the bank’s management should be held partly accountable, and
macroeconomic shocks, for which the bank bears no responsibility. Based on a well-known

33

A variant of this countercyclical rule is dynamic provisioning, which was used by Spain before the subprime
crisis.
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principle (due to Holmström 1979) according to which economic agents should be held
accountable only for outcomes over which they have control, it can therefore be argued that
the Basel rules are excessively tough on (lenient with) banks in recessions (booms). This
suggests some automatic recapitalization process in banking recessions and some tax on
banking leverage during booms ( the combination of the two amounting to an insurance
scheme provided by the government).

7.

A call for macro-prudential regulation

As we noted earlier, an important recent trend has been the sharp increase in financial
institutions' reliance on short-term, market liabilities. For example:


Commercial banks have pledged substantial liquidity support to the conduits.
According to Acharya and Schnabl, the 10 largest conduit administrators (mainly
commercial banks) had a ratio of asset backed commercial paper to equity ranging
from 32.1% to 336.6%. See Figure 4.



The increase in the market share of investment banks mechanically increases the
financial sector's interest rate fragility, as investment banks rely on repo and
commercial paper funding much more than commercial banks do. See Figure 5.



Primary dealers have increased their overnight to term borrowing ratio. See Figure
6.



LBOs have become more levered. See Figure 7.

Figure 4
Source: Chapter 2 in Acharya-Richardson (2009).
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Figure 5
Source: flow of funds (percentage of total assets)

Overall, there has been a tremendous increase in the proportion of short-term liabilities in the
financial sector. See Figure 6. Accordingly, there is a widespread feeling that maturity
mismatches have played a prominent role in the crisis and that monetary policy and financial
stability are closely linked (Adrian-Shin 2008).

Figure 6
Source : Haver Analytics
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Leverage Ratio for LBOs (1999-2007)
This figure graphs the average total debt leverage ratio for LBOs in both the U.S. and Europe with EBITDA of 50
million or more in dollars or Euros, respectively. The chart covers the period from 1999 to 2007.

Figure 7
Source: Standard & Poor's LCD.

Figure 8
Source: Adrian-Shin (2009)

The recent crisis unveiled the dire consequences of a widespread maturity mismatch. This
section, based on the analysis in Farhi-Tirole (2009b), argues that there is a two-way
relationship between maturity mismatches and the massive bailout that we have witnessed.
The public bailout of the financial sector has taken many forms, but can be roughly
decomposed into a monetary bailout and a fiscal one. The former consists in keeping
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extremely low short-term rates so as to allow institutions that have chosen to depend on the
wholesale market not to go under. The latter takes the form of recapitalizations, liquidity
support and asset repurchases.
Let us start with monetary bailouts. The benefit of a loose monetary policy is, as we have
seen, that it rescues institutions that rely on the wholesale market for their funding. The costs
associated with keeping interest rates low are several. 34 First, low interest rates establish a
wedge between marginal rate of substitution and marginal rate of transformation. Second,
they induce an implicit subsidy from consumers to the corporate sector (hence the use of the
term "bailout", which in common language takes the more neutral form of "support to the
banking system" or of "transmission mechanism"); the lower yield on savings transfers
resources from consumers to borrowers, but unlike a direct recapitalization the money does
not transit through the state. Third, they sow the seeds for the next crisis: low short-term
interest rates boost investment by lowering the overall cost of capital; they also encourage
institutions to borrow short and thereby to adopt an illiquid balance sheet. Adrian and Shin
(2008) document the relationship between low interest rates and maturity mismatches in the
case of investment banks. This third cost also fits with the idea of a “risk-taking channel”in
the transmission mechanism, i.e., of an impact of changes in policy rates on risk perception
and risk tolerance (Borio-Zhu 2008). Fourth, a loose monetary policy creates inflation and
distorts money demand, and, in New-Keynesian models, induces price dispersion.
The key observation is that, except for the (more or less proportional) implicit subsidy
component, the costs of a loose monetary policy are economy-wide; they resemble a “fixed
cost”. Consequently, the central bank is willing to incur these costs if there are enough
(strategic) fragile players. Put differently, the policy response makes balance-sheet risk
choices strategic complements. The more other institutions (especially ones that a central
bank will be eager to rescue, such as large banks ot too-interconnected-to-fail institutions)
gamble on the yield curve and adopt an illiquid balance sheet, the more an individual bank is
expecting to face a low interest rate and thus favorable refinancing conditions, and so the
more it benefits from sacrificing capital insurance for scale.
To sum up, when everyone engages in maturity transformation, authorities haver little choice
but facilitating refinancing, and so refusing to adopt a risky balance sheet lowers the return
on equity. This simple observation has several corollaries:


There may be multiple equilibria.



In contrast with CAPM, which predicts that banks, if endowed with the freedom to
select the states of nature in which they face financial difficulties, will choose
positions that, whenever feasible, makes them negatively correlated with the market
portfolio, it is in the interest of each bank to be illiquid in the same states of nature
as other banks. The prediction is then one of a joint concentration on the same hightail risk and of an endogenous macroeconomic uncertainty.



While corporate finance theory predicts that an increase in the probability of needing
cash increases the demand for capital insurance (i.e, more hoarding of liquidity), the
endogenization of the policy response shows that an increase in the probability of
distress may reduce the incentive to hoard liquidity. The reason for this surprising
result is that the increase in the probability of distress may imply that more
institutions are indeed in distress, forcing the central bank to implement a loose
monetary policy.

34

See Farhi-Tirole (2009b) for more detail.
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The central bank faces a time-inconsistency problem. It would want to commit to a
tough monetary policy, but when push comes to shove and if enough key institutions
choose to rely on wholesale markets, it will lower interest rates.



This offers a rationale for macro-prudential regulation, i.e., regulation that does not
just look at the liquidity and solvency positions of individual banks, but also looks at
the overall maturity mismatch. 35



The analysis suggests imposing a minimum liquidity requirement, at least for those
actors that authorities will be keen to rescue. By contrast, subsidizing liquidity often
reduces welfare: institutions’ cost of financing then decreases, inducing them to
increase their leverage, making ex-post bailouts even more necessary.



When banks are subject to a minimum liquidity requirement, they may choose to
substitute cheaper, but potentially toxic assets for more expensive and safer stores
of value. Furthermore, the choices of liquid asset quality often exhibit strategic
complementarities as well. Thus the regulator should also monitor the quality and
not only the quantity of liquid assets.

Monetary bailouts are an important, but not the unique component of rescue packages.
Typically, authorities also engage in recapitalizations. One may wonder whether monetary
policy should be part of a rescue package, since its effects are diffuse and targeted rescues
would seem to be a more appropriate response to banking problems. The paper applies
mechanism design to obtain the optimal rescue package. The first conclusion is that
monetary policy, because it benefits those institutions that really need cash, is always part of
a rescue package, despite the fact that it is less targeted than direct recapitalizations.
Actually, it is the only form of bailout over a range of parameters. In general, though,
monetary policy is complemented by a recapitalization, perhaps involving a deleveraging
request in order to screen out banks that would want to benefit from subsidized public
support, but don’t really need the money. The bottom line is that monetary and fiscal bailouts,
if different in their working and effects, work toward the common objective of restoring the
institutions' liquidity and solvency positions and cannot be conceived separately.

8.

Concluding note

Liquidity mismatches and the over-reliance on wholesale funding were at the core of failures
and rescues in the recent crisis. Despite much progress in our understanding of what drives
liquidity shortages at the individual and aggregate levels, academic knowledge still has some
way to go in order to provide satisfactory inputs into the design of regulatory and monetary
policies. Achieving this will require further convergence between micro-and macroeconomics. Microeconomists interested in financial regulation and markets can no longer
ignore macroeconomic factors leading to the simultaneously freeze in markets that are
central to the institutions’ market and funding liquidity; they must develop better models of
systemic risk; and they can no longer look at institutions in isolation and not consider the
overall maturity mismatch and the allocation of financial muscle.
Conversely, macroeconomists need to account for arcane details of prudential regulation,
corporate finance and market microstructure if they are to develop a better understanding of
countercyclical monetary policies and the transmission mechanism; Keynes’ and Hicks’

35

For admonitory work on the need to engage on macro-prudential oversight, see Borio (2003) and Borio-Shim
(2007).

27

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2010

31

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 467 [2010]

emphasis on liquidity called for an integrated view of micro and macro treatments of the
financial system. I hope that the crisis will encourage the pursuit of the corresponding
research agenda and accelerate the convergence between the two fields.
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Appendix. Liquidity demand: a simple framework 36
Consider the following simple framework.
There are three periods: t = 0,1, 2 . Investors demand a (normalized) return equal to 1 per
unit invested between dates 0 and 2, and to R between dates 1 and 2.
Illiquid assets. At date 0, a representative banking entrepreneur has wealth (equity) a and
invests i in "illiquid assets". If resold at date 1, illiquid assets yield p per unit. So a higher p
means that the asset is less illiquid.
If brought to completion (i.e., to date 2), a unit of illiquid asset yields 1 , of which only  0 is
pledgeable to investors, where  0 < 1 . That 1 > 0 ("investors cannot grab the entire
cake") is the essential difference of this framework with the Arrow-Debreu model. The wedge
1  0 can be motivated by private benefits of control, perks, verifiability problems or
required incentive payments. Illiquid assets also yield r per unit at date 1. We assume that
R >  0 , since otherwise (and as we are going to observe) the bank would never have any
refinancing problem.
Liquidity shock. At date 1, with probability  the bank does not face a liquidity shock and can
proceed to reap the benefits from investment at date 2. With probability 1   , the bank faces
a liquidity shock at date 1 and must then reinvest 1 unit per unit of investment to be brought
to completion at date 2. Let j , 0  j  i , denote the size of the continuation. The ratio
(i  j )/i measures the extent of downsizing in case of an adverse shock.
Liquid asset. Finally, the banking entrepreneur can invest at date 0 in an asset that yields 1
per unit at date 2. The date-0 price of this store of value is q  1 (it must exceed 1 since
otherwise investors would increase their demand for it). Liquidity is costly if q > 1 (recall that
consumers demand to recoup 1 at date 2 per unit invested at date 0). Let xi denote the
date-0 investment in this store of value. The number x is akin to a liquidity ratio.
We assume that investors can monitor the bank's liquidity position and therefore condition
their lending on it.
(a)

Feasible continuations.

In case of a liquidity shock, the bank can use:


its hoarded liquidity, with value xi at date 2



its market liquidity, with value p (i  j ) at date 1



its date-1 income, ri



its funding liquidity, with value  0i at date 2.

The last term deserves some explanation: the most that the bank can obtain by diluting its
existing investors, i.e., the total value of the securities it issues is the pledgeable income. So
feasible continuations must obey the liquidity condition:

36

This follows Farhi-Tirole (2009b), and is straight in the spirit of the model in Holmström-Tirole (1998).
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j

 0 j  xi

 p(i  j )  ri.

R

(1)

Note that low-interest rate conditions at date 1 (a low R ) favors continuation, and so
expectations of low interest rates make liquidity hoarding less necessary. Similarly, and
unless the bank refuses to sell assets, market liquidity (as measured by p ) makes it easier
to refinance.
A liquidity need (i.e., a need for hoarding stores of value x > 0 if one wishes to fully
withstand the liquidity shock) arises if

0
R

< 1 r

i.e., if the net per unit cash demand 1  r exceeds the funding liquidity, a condition that we
will assume.
(b) Borrowing capability (solvency ratio).
At date 0, the bank needs to borrow

i  a  qxi,
an amount that investors must recoup later on. In the absence of liquidity shock, there is no
reason to downsize and the latter receive  0i at date 2 and ri at date 1.
In case of a liquidity shock, the bank either continues at scale j given by (1):

j=

( x  Rr  Rp )i
R(1  p )   0

(2)

(at the optimum, the RHS of (2) will never exceed i , as hoarding liquidity is costly); or it
resells all its assets at price p  this extreme outcome stems from the linearity of the model.
Furthermore, and again from linearity, it can easily be shown that in this model it is optimal to
hoard liquidity so as to continue at full scale ( j = i ) or not at all ( j = 0 ). 37
To shorten the analysis, let us assume that r = 0 (the asset's return is fully backloaded) and
p = 0 (the asset is completely illiquid).
Then, if the bank decides to hoard liquidity so that j = i even in case of a shock, from (2)

x = R  0 .
Its borrowing capacity is then given by

i  a  qxi =  ( 0  x)i,
or

i=

a
1  q( R   0 )   R

(3)

and the banking entrepreneur's utility is

37

Partial downsizing arises naturally when one considers a continuum of shocks.
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U = ( 1  0 )i.
If the bank chooses to be illiquid ( x = 0 and therefore j = 0 in case of a shock), the new
investment I is given by

I  a =  0 I
or
I=

a
1   0

> i.

There is therefore a trade-off between liquidity(capital insurance) and scale.
Hoarding liquidity is really about buying costly insurance from investors. It is optimal if and
only if

( 1   0 )i   ( 1   0 ) I ,
or
(1   ) 2



 ( q  1)(1   0 )  (1  R )( q   ).

(4)

Obviously hoarding liquidity is optimal if it is cheap ( q close to 1) and shocks are not unlikely
(  is not close to 1). Liquidity hoarding is also more attractive when the pledgeable income
(  0 ) is high: hoarded liquidity is then easily complemented by funding liquidity.
(c) Demand for liquid assets and the liquidity discount
Suppose that there is a limited volume LS of stores of value in the economy. Equation (4),
taken with equality, establishes an upper bound q max on how much banking entrepreneurs
are willing to pay for these stores of value.
This upper bound increases with the probability 1   of a shock and with the pledgeability of
returns  0 and decreases with R (recall that R  0 ). Let LD denote the demand for
liquidity whenever 1 < q  q max :

LD = ( R   0 )i =

( R   0 )a
.
1  q( R   0 )   R

(5)

Figure 9 depicts the equilibrium in the market for stores of value.
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Figure 9
(d) Boom-bust episodes
Suppose that the banks' equity a increases at date 0. Then investment grows. If we keep the
interest rate R constant, the increase in bank equity, ceteris paribus, leads to an increase in
investment, and therefore to an increase in liquidity demand (see equation (5)).
Consequently, the price q of liquid assets adjust so as to clear the market for stores of
value. For a large enough boom, the increase in equity leads to an actual increase in
investment and a lower liquidity ratio x = LS /i , which later creates a bust in bad times.
(e) Should the bank's liquidity position be monitored?
Let us finally investigate whether, when left unmonitored, the bank would want to underhoard
liquidity when full-scale continuation is optimal, or to overhoard liquidity when partial
continuation is optimal.
Temptation to underhoard?
Suppose that condition (4) obtains and so capital insurance is optimal. Let the banking
entrepreneur deviate from the agreement and invest all his date-0 money into illiquid assets.
The investment level is then:

I = [1+q(R-0)]i.
When the bank is intact, the investors cannot credibly punish the banking entrepreneur for
this departure from their agreement, since they get 0 I in case of continuation and 0 in case
of closure. Thus, a form of soft budget constraint obtains. By contrast the bank is closed
down when distressed.
The banking entrepreneur's expected net utility becomes:

Uˆ =  ( 1   0 ) I .
Underhoarding occurs if liquidity is left unmonitored if and only if Û  U , or  I > i. Thus
underhoarding is a concern whenever

 [1  q( R   0 )] > 1.

(6)

Ceteris paribus, underhoarding is thus more likely, the lower the probability of a shock (
large), the more expansive the stores of value (q high), and the higher the cost of refinancing
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(R). Of course, to obtain a complete picture, we should not forget that hoarding liquidity is
optimal in the first place, that is, I  I. Thus underhoarding also requires I > I, or

1  q( R   0 )
1
>
,
1  q( R   0 )   R 1   0
which can be shown to be equivalent to

1
q

0 < .

(7)

To sum up, underhoarding may occur if (6) and (7) (which are not inconsistent) are satisfied.
Note the nature of the externality on investors: when economizing on liquidity to increase
size, the banking entrepreneur deprives the investors of the value (R-0)i of the store of value
when unneeded (i.e., when the bank is intact); on the other hand, the investors also make a
large profit, due to the large size, when the bank is intact. In order for the banking
entrepreneur to benefit from underhoarding, it must be the case that investors lose in net
terms. This is not always the case, and indeed condition (6) is required to obtain
underhoarding.
Temptation to overhoard?
Suppose that, to the contrary (4) is violated and so it is optimal not to have capital insurance.
The banking entrepreneur, when deviating from the agreement and allocating some of the
date-0 cash to stores of value, can invest at level k given by:

I = k  q( R   0 ) k .
Let us assume that at date 1, (R-0)k is then some "free cash flow'' (à la Jensen) that the
banking entrepreneur can use in case of distress (note that the investors have no incentive to
let him do so, as they prefer to pay themselves (R-0)k rather than re-invest this sum into a
negative NPV project).
Overhoarding yields expected net utility

Uˆ = ( 1   0 )k
and benefits the entrepreneur if and only if k > I, or

1 >  [1  q( R   0 )] ,

(8)

that is if (6) is violated.
The nature of the externality on investors can again be described in terms of size versus
availability of the store of value: When the bank is intact, the claimholders obtain a lower
profit due to a lower size, but can seize the hoarded liquidity (R-0)k, that they were not
expected to be available.
As earlier, we must not forget that capital insurance was suboptimal in the first place, i.e.,
that I > i. Thus overhoarding may arise if and only if k>I, or

0
R

>

1
,
1  q( R   0 )

which is equivalent to

0 >

1
q

(9)
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Note that (9) holds when (7) is violated. The overhoarding analysis thus perfectly mirrors that
of underhoarding!

38

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper467

42

Tirole: Illiquidity and all its Friends

Illiquidity and all its friends
By Jean Tirole

Discussion by Franklin Allen 1
Jean Tirole’s paper provides an excellent coverage of the literature on the role of liquidity in
crises and other related phenomena. He starts by outlining the important characteristics of
the current crisis: (i) massive illiquidity; (ii) market freezes; (iii) fire sales; (iv) contagion; and
(v) insolvencies and bailouts. He then relates these events to the academic literature on
market breakdowns due to: (i) adverse selection; and (ii) shortage of financial muscle. He
then provides a macroeconomic perspective based on aggregate liquidity shortages; and
draws policy conclusions on (i) mark to market (ii) monetary versus fiscal bailouts and (iii) the
need for macroprudential regulation.
Two frameworks are primarily used in this analysis. The first is the seminal paper Holmstrom
and Tirole (1998). As is well known, the basic theme of this paper is that “finance as you go”
may be prevented by market failures due to asymmetric information and other imperfections.
The alternative is “liquidity hoarding” where firms hold assets to enable them to survive and
keep investing. The key issue then becomes whether there are enough liquid assets in the
economy to allow firms to undertake this hoarding. If not then the public sector may need to
provide such assets.
The second is Farhi and Tirole (2009), which is also a seminal paper. This develops a model
where there are strategic complementarities between banks in their choice of debt levels
because of the reaction of the monetary authorities in setting monetary policy. If all banks
become highly levered then when there is a negative shock there will be a systemic crisis
that affects many banks. This leads the authorities to engage in a monetary bailout where
they set low short term interest rates to allow banks to recuperate their financial position due
to the positive spread between short term and long term interest rates. There may also be
fiscal bailouts where the government simply provides funds to banks. Strategic
complementarities between bank strategies caused by government policies create a need for
macroprudential policies by the government to prevent banks from using so much leverage.
In this discussion, I will develop a parallel analysis of the crisis to underline the factors that I
think are important in addition to those stressed by Jean (see also Allen and Carletti (2009)).
Despite its severity and its ample effects, the current crisis is similar to past crises in many
dimensions. In a recent paper, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) document the effects of banking
crises using an extensive data set of high and middle-to-low income countries. They find that
systemic banking crises are typically preceded by credit booms and asset price bubbles. This
is consistent with Borio and Lowe (2002) and Herring and Wachter (2003) who show that
many financial crises are the result of bubbles in real estate markets. In addition, Reinhart
and Rogoff find that crises result, on average, in a 35% real drop in housing prices spread
over a period of 6 years. Equity prices fall 55% over 3 ½ years. Output falls by 9% over two
years, while unemployment rises 7% over a period of 4 years. Central government debt rises
86% compared to its pre-crisis level. Reinhart and Rogoff stress that the major episodes are
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sufficiently far apart that policymakers and investors typically believe that “this time is
different.”
The seeds of the current crisis can be traced to the low interest rate policies adopted by the
Federal Reserve and other central banks after the collapse of the technology stock bubble. In
addition, the appetite of Asian central banks for (debt) securities contributed to lax credit.
These factors helped fuel a dramatic increase in house prices in the U.S. as shown in Figure
1 and several other countries such as Spain, Ireland and the U.K. In 2006 this bubble
reached its peak in the U.S. and house prices there and elsewhere fell.
What caused the illiquidity of many financial markets that has characterized the crisis and is
the focus on Jean’s paper? After the real estate market peaked in July 2006, severe financial
market problems started about one year later after it had become clearer that the run-up in
real estate prices had been the first phase of a bubble. The start of the collapse in the real
estate bubble had a dramatic effect on the pricing of many mortgage-backed securities.
Despite having been rated triple-A by the credit rating agencies, these prices fell
dramatically, particularly for those securities backed by subprime mortgages. Many of these
mortgages were held in Special Investment Vehicles (SIVs) financed by short term debt. This
funding quickly dried up once it became clear that the underlying securities were worth much
less than the original prices they were issued at. One of the important questions is why the
prices of the securitized mortgages fell so quickly.
One leading possibility covered by Jean is liquidity factors. Once investors realized that these
mortgages were more risky than had been initially thought, many readjusted their portfolios
by selling. This led to a fire sale and a collapse in prices. Once the link between prices and
fundamentals had been broken limits to arbitrage prevented this link from being reestablished. In other words, it became risky to buy the securities on the assumption their
price would move up because before this happened they might continue to fall.
A second possibility is that there was adverse selection in the market. Observing the quality
of these securities is difficult. As a result sellers of the securities have an incentive to sell the
low quality ones and keep the high quality ones. In anticipation of this, buyers will only pay a
very low price.
A third possibility that has received little attention is that prices of these securities fell
precipitously because of the nature of the adjustment process of real estate prices. Whereas
stock prices adjust very quickly to the arrival of new information, real estate prices do not.
The decentralized nature of these markets and the fact that many participants are not well
informed means that price adjustment takes time. In bubble episodes there is thus serial
correlation in price movements. This makes it very difficult to price mortgage backed
securities and this makes them illiquid. These two factors together can provide an
explanation of the discounts of 60-70 percent that were seen in these markets.
One of the most surprising aspects of the crisis was the fact that so many people in the U.S.
ignored the possibility that real estate prices were a bubble. Many similar episodes had
occurred in Asia and Europe and numerous observers had pointed to the fact that there was
probably a bubble in U.S. property prices. For example, The Economist newspaper ran
frequent articles pointing out that a crash in property prices was likely. Despite this many
investors appeared to attach zero probability to the possibility of a fall in real estate prices in
their analysis.
What caused the bubble? The first factor is that the monetary policies of central banks
particularly the US Federal Reserve were too loose – they focused too much on consumer
price inflation and ignored asset price inflation. Holding interest rates at 1 percent when
house prices were rising at a faster rate in 2003 and 2004 made it very attractive to buy
houses. This was especially true given the tax deductibility of interest on mortgages
compared to no deductibility of rent and various government policies designed to encourage
poor people to own their own homes. These incentives to buy sparked a housing price
bubble. Once housing prices were moving upwards at a fast rate, the bubble continued even
40
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though interest rates were subsequently raised. There was still an incentive to purchase
because of the rapid increase in prices.
However, the low interest rate policies of the Federal Reserve are not sufficient to explain
why many other countries such as Spain and Ireland also had property bubbles. Here
interest rates were not as low in absolute terms. The second important factor responsible for
the bubble is global imbalances. The origin of these dates back to the Asian crisis of 1997
and the policies of the IMF. Countries with fundamentally sound economies like South Korea
were forced to raise interest rates and cut government spending when they needed help.
This was precisely the opposite of what the U.S. and Europe did when faced with a crisis.
Moreover these policies caused great economic dislocation in South Korea. Many companies
were bankrupted and unemployment soared from around 3 percent to above 9 percent.
Other Asian economies were similarly affected by these harsh policies. Asian countries are
under-represented in the governance and staffing of the IMF. This meant that they could not
effectively protest and have the policies imposed on them in exchange for assistance
reversed. After the crisis was over Asian countries concluded that it was better to accumulate
reserves to ensure they did not need to approach the IMF in the future. Figure 2 shows this
accumulation of reserves by China, Chinese Taipei,. Hong Kong SAR, Japan, Singapore and
South Korea It can be seen that in contrast Latin American and central and eastern
European countries did not accumulate reserves during this period.
These Asian reserves were mostly invested in debt securities, primarily Treasuries and
mortgage-backed securities. This lead to a lowering of credit standards as financial
intermediaries tried to find outlets for all these funds. This lowering of credit standards was
also an important contributor to the housing bubble that occurred in the U.S. and other
countries.
The private sector has come into considerable criticism for excessive risk taking. There is
little doubt that the massive leverage adopted by many investment banks and hedge funds
has contributed to the severity of the crisis. However, in my view it was excessive risk taking
in the public sector that was a more important cause of the crisis. When the Federal Reserve
held interest rates at unprecedentedly low levels in 2003 and 2004, they were taking a great
risk. Although they avoided a serious recession then, they laid the foundations for the current
severe crisis. Although central bank independence is good for preventing inflation it is not
desirable for financial stability. Central banks have very little constraints in adopting new and
risky policies. Because of his dominance of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, the decision to lower interest rates to such low levels was effectively made by one
man, the Chairman, Alan Greenspan.
A current example of risk taking by the public sector is quantitative easing. This involves the
central banking creating money for the purpose of buying back longer term securities to try
and drive down long term interest rates. This has not been tried very much before and
therefore its effects are not well understood. Once again the Federal Reserve is taking a
large risk. There has been very little discussion of this. One exception is a speech by
Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin on June 2, 2009. She argued that the Federal Reserve
and the Bank of England should stop the unconventional monetary policy of quantitative
easing as it was sowing the seeds of the next crisis. The next day Chairman Bernanke
politely replied that with respect he disagreed. However, since then the Federal Reserve has
tempered its policy and voices within the Federal Reserve have raised concern about
inflation from these policies.
Having the German Chancellor break with long tradition to discuss the policies of other
countries’ central banks is probably not an optimal governance mechanism for the Federal
Reserve. What are needed are more checks and balances within the system. One possibility
is to impose a duty of financial stability on the Federal Reserve. Another is to reform the
operational procedures of the Federal Reserve so that the Chairman has less power and the
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Presidents of the regional Federal Reserves have more. The Board itself can thus act as
more of a check than is currently the case.
Even if the Federal Reserve and other central banks can be reformed to curb public sector
risk taking, there would still be the problem of global imbalances. It was argued above that
these have arisen as a result of the Asian crisis of 1997. The acquisition of reserves has
worked very well for the countries that have done it. For example, South Korea has fared
much better in this crisis than in 1997. Its large reserves have meant that it did not need to
go to the IMF and could make its own decisions. It lowered interest rates and raised
government expenditures like other countries. The exchange rate suffered as a result but in
fact this was beneficial as it helped prevent a precipitous drop in economic activity. For
example, whereas Japan’s GDP fell 4.0 percent in Quarter 1 of 2009, South Korea’s
increased by 0.1 percent despite their having similar export-oriented economies.
However, for the other countries in the world the acquisition of reserves has not been
advantageous since it is arguably a major contributor to the crisis. It has been a very
inefficient mechanism from a global perspective. In addition it is very costly in terms of lost
consumption for the country acquiring the reserves. If their high level is maintained then this
is a permanent loss. A better system would probably be to have ex post sharing of risk. A
situation where the IMF lent money to countries having difficulties would not involve these
drawbacks. However, the current governance system prevents the IMF from fulfilling this role
as the Asian countries do not trust that they will be treated fairly. Current proposals to reform
the IMF do not solve the problem as they still leave China and South Korea in particular
under-represented.
The Chinese have proposed a global currency to replace the dollar as the major reserve
currency. This would presumably operate something like the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights
(SDRs). This would run into the same governance problem in that an international
organization would be needed to run it and the Asian countries would need to be assured
that they would be properly represented. A third possibility is that the renminbi becomes fully
convertible and as a result can itself become a reserve currency. With the dollar, the euro
and the renminbi as major reserve currencies, the Chinese would not need to hold reserves
and other countries would be able to diversify their foreign exchange reserve currency
reserves much better than at present. This is probably the best feasible long run solution but
will take several years to implement.
Reforming central bank governance and solving the global imbalance problems are not the
only two reforms that are needed. Reducing the possibility of future crises and mitigating
their effects will require other key reforms.
“Too big to fail” is not “Too big to liquidate”
The actions of governments in bailing out large financial institutions have laid the seeds for
future crises by creating significant moral hazard. Large institutions know that they will not be
allowed to fail. If they have problems the government will step in and save them. This
encourages them to take significant risks and benefit when these are successful while the
government bears the cost of failures. In order to prevent this moral hazard, the owners and
managers of financial institutions must be faced with the consequences of their actions. The
reason for not allowing banks to fail is that this causes contagion as in the case of Lehman in
September 2008. However, it is possible to prevent contagion while at the same time limiting
moral hazard by liquidating any bank that requires government help to avoid failure.
Enforcing this kind of policy would be a significant step forward.
Resolution of large complex cross-border financial institutions
A major difficulty in designing a framework that allows financial institutions to be liquidated is
how to deal with large complex cross border institutions. In particular, there is the problem of
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which countries should bear any losses from an international mismatch of assets and
liabilities. This has proved a thorny problem for the European Union in designing a cross
border regime to support its desire for a single market in financial services. For countries
without political ties like the EU it is an even more difficult problem. Designing such a system
is one of the most urgent tasks facing governments.
Limited government debt guarantees for financial institutions
In the current crisis bank bondholders have effectively had a government guarantee. There is
an important issue of whether this is desirable. Such a guarantee prevents disorderly
wholesale runs. However, this again provides undesirable long term precedents. Going
forward holders of bank debt will know it is guaranteed and will not have any incentive to
exert market discipline. If failing banks are nationalized and liquidated in an orderly manner
as discussed above, it should be possible to impose losses on long term bondholders and
other debt holders. This should provide incentives for market discipline by bondholders.
Removal of tax subsidies for debt
The tax system in many countries subsidizes the use of debt in many ways. For example, in
the U.S. mortgage interest is tax deductible. Also interest is deductible for the purposes of
the corporate income tax. These kinds of incentives to use debt are not desirable in a
financial stability context. They should be removed.
Capital adequacy regulation should be based on market capital as well as accounting
capital
Capital adequacy rules have an important role to play in preventing contagion and other
problems. However, one aspect of their current implementation is that they are based on
accounting capital. When Wachovia failed last year its accounting capital was above
regulatory limits even though the market was no longer willing to provide funds. This example
underlines the importance of using market capital in regulation, in addition to accounting
capital.
Mark-to-market or historic cost accounting?
Financial institutions have traditionally used historic cost accounting for many of their assets.
This is problematic if assets fall in value as the financial institutions are able to hide this fact
for significant periods of time. A good example is the S&L crisis in the U.S. in the 1980’s.
This kind of episode encouraged a move to mark-to-market accounting in by the IASB and
U.S. FASB (see, eg Plantin, Sapra, and Shin (2008) and Allen and Carletti (2008a)). During
the current crisis where it is not at all clear that market prices reflect fundamental values,
mark-to-market accounting has come under severe criticism by financial institutions and has
been relaxed by the FASB under political pressure from Congress.
How should the advantages and disadvantages of mark-to-market accounting be balanced?
As long as markets are efficient, mark-to-market accounting dominates. However, if as
during times of crisis they cease to be efficient, market prices do not provide a good guide for
regulators and investors. The key issue then becomes how to identify whether financial
markets are working properly or not. Allen and Carletti (2008b) suggest that when market
prices and model based prices diverge significantly (more than 2% say), financial institutions
should publish both. If regulators and investors see many financial institutions independently
publishing different valuations they can deduce that financial markets may no longer be
efficient and can act accordingly.
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A role for public sector banks in a mixed system
Some countries such as Chile with its Banco Estado have a publicly owned commercial bank
that competes with private sector banks. In times of crisis, such a bank can expand and help
stabilize the market as all market participants know that it is backed by the state and will not
fail. At the moment, that is what the Federal Reserve is effectively doing. They have become
one of the biggest commercial banks in the world. But the employees of the Fed do not have
much expertise in running a commercial bank. They don't know much about credit risk. They
are mostly macroeconomists who are interested in monetary policy. It would be better to
have expertise in the public sector which allows the state to perform commercial banking
functions during times of crisis.
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Tirole: Illiquidity and all its Friends

Figure 1
The Case-Shiller 10 Cities Composite Index

Source: The S&P – Case-Shiller website

Figure 2
A Comparison of Foreign Exchange Reserves in Different Regions

Source: IMF website.
Asia is the six East Asian countries China, Hong Kong SAR, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Chinese Taipei.
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